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Introduction
Recent outbreaks of food-borne pathogens have focused the attention of consumers and
regulators on the issue of food safety, typically with an emphasis on understanding the
demand for safer food. Despite efforts by government agencies and private firms to ensure
that food is safe, some products contain bacteria, parasites, fungi and viruses that, when
consumed, lead to illness.  Currently, more than 40 different food-borne microbial
pathogens are known to cause sickness in humans (Buzby et al., 2001). With incidences
of such illnesses imposing significant costs on countries’ food marketing and health care
systems, food safety has emerged as a very serious policy issue.
Individuals' attitudes and beliefs shape their perceptions of food safety risk. In
turn, risk perceptions affect consumers’ willingness to pay for food safety improvements.
Yet, this relationship is difficult to generalize.
1 Risk-related behavioural research suggests
that individuals overestimate the likelihood of low-probability events, while under-
assessing the likelihood of high-probability events (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). However,
these biases are poorly understood in terms of food safety risks.  Consumers' difficulty in
risk appraisal and tendency to misassess low-probability risks motivate the need to expand
the research framework to include the concept of risk perceptions.
The objective of this study is to estimate the value that Canadians place on
improvements in food safety, while investigating the presence of systematic
misassessments of food safety risk by consumers. This is accomplished using an
                                                
1 The nonmarket nature of food safety complicates consumers' valuation decisions, and researchers' ability
to evaluate it, since safety is an implicit and often invisible characteristic of food products.2
experimental auction design, with two explicit risk reductions and a mid-way release of
objective risk information to allow for identification of these misassessments.
Consumer risk-related decisions require some assessment of risk, yet objective
information is seldom available. Instead, consumers develop subjective risk probabilities
based on their perceptions of the hazard. Since consumer preferences reflect their
perceptions, a modified expected utility framework can be used to understand the income-
risk tradeoff and marginal willingness to pay for risk reductions. Nevertheless, few
previous studies have incorporated the effects of consumers’ risk perceptions into the
valuation framework (Eom, 1995).
While several measurement techniques exist, experimental auctions create
nonhypothetical environments in which to examine consumer choices. The laboratory
auction setting enables economic researchers to identify, isolate and understand how
consumers trade money for reduced risk. Although risk cannot be eliminated, it can be
managed and minimized through tradeoffs. While individuals face tradeoffs in many parts
of their lives, including tastes and aestethics, the focus of this study is the tradeoff
between dollars and risk. A risk-dollar tradeoff implies that an individual is aware of both
the risk and the opportunity to mitigate risk. Information about the nature of risk is
required for an unbiased assessment of tradeoffs. Ideally, extensive experimental evidence
would support individuals' decisions regarding the probabilities of risks. Instead,
subjective assessments are relied upon for practical decision-making. The decision
process is not straightforward, however, as individuals must also consider budgetary
constraints in the food safety tradeoff. Efficiency in tradeoffs requires that individuals3
think systematically about risks, yet decisions under uncertainty are notoriously difficult
to make (Viscusi et al., 1986).
Conceptual Model
Risk-averse individuals may be willing to pay a premium to avoid a risky event. In a
lottery with money, risk-averse individuals may choose to forgo a portion of certain
wealth to avoid a gamble with an equivalent expected value. In the case of food safety,
wealth may be considered as not only monetary wealth, but also non-monetary factors like
time and health. Sickness from food-borne illness reduces a person’s physical health, but
also leads to wealth losses through lost wages due to absence from employment and time
spent undergoing medical treatment. It follows, then, that risk-averse consumers may
choose to forgo some portion of their monetary wealth to avoid the food safety “gamble”,
which could affect their overall wealth.
Jones-Lee (1974) outlines a conceptual framework, later adapted by Smith and
Desvousges (1987), that demonstrates the maximum an individual will pay for a risk
change.
2 Jones-Lee recognizes the subjective nature of risk, and presents subjective
probabilities as the most relevant concept for the context.
3 Specifically, in a two-state
world, an individual faces probabilities p of sickness (state S) and (1-p) of health (state H).
Typically, health is preferred to sickness. Individuals' utility functions are state-dependent
and functions of wealth W. Individuals act to maximize expected utility (EU), where:
                                                
2 While Jones-Lee modelled life and death as states of the world, in the case of food safety, the two relevant
states are sickness and health.
3 Jones-Lee (1974) suggests that, since it is unlikely that individuals view their own deaths or injury as the
subject of repeated experiments, preconditions for objective risk probability based on relative frequency are
not fulfilled.4
(1)  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( W pS W H p EU + - =
where  ) (W H  is the utility of wealth associated with health and  ) (W S  is the utility of
wealth associated with sickness. Utility functions  ) (W H  and  ) (W S  are continuous,
unique up to the same linear transformation, and at least twice-differentiable. Individuals
are assumed to prefer more to less (wealth) and to be financially risk averse.
Suppose an individual has wealth ( 0 > W ) and faces probability  p , where
1 0 < < p , of sickness, expected utility is then given by:
(2)  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( W S p W H p EU + - = .
Now suppose that the individual has the opportunity to reduce the probability of sickness
from  p  to  p . Given the restrictions, an individual will forfeit a positive amount, V, in
exchange for the lower probability of death. The maximum amount he will give up must
leave him with the same level of expected utility as initially experienced. The V is
determined by solving the following equality for V :
(3)  (1 - p) H (W - V, Z) + p S (W - V, Z) = (1 -  p ) H (W, Z) +  p  S (W, Z)
where Z is a vector of socio-demographic variables.
4
Jones-Lee establishes the general form of the functional relationship of probability
and payment, V(p), depicted with the solid curve-linear relationship between V and p
(Figure 1). V is positive for values of p less than  p (paying for an increase in safety), and
                                                
4 Similarly, if the individual accepts an increase in probability of sickness, the minimum amount he requires
as compensation will increase his wealth to where the higher probability and wealth also satisfy condition
(3).5
negative for values of p more than  p (demanding compensation for decreased safety).
5
The marginal value of a decrease in risk from the initial risk level is  -¶V/¶p, and can be
shown to increase with both initial risk and initial wealth.
6
In Jones-Lee’s expected utility model context, willingness-to-pay values reflect
individuals’ assessment of both initial risk and reduced risk.  If participants initially
perceive food safety risk to be lower than the objective level, then their bids should
increase once aware of the magnitude of the threat. Conversely, if food safety risk is
initially overestimated, bids will decrease once objective risk estimates have been
announced. Figure 1 illustrates patterns in willingness-to-pay values (V) based on initial
risk levels ( i p ) and reduced risk levels (pi), where i Î{t,u,o}, t is threshold risk, u is
underestimated and o is overestimated risks (relative to the threshold). Threshold levels
are baseline risk levels defined as “typical” by experts. Since the function V depends on p,
differences in perceptions of p result in different curves.  For illustrative purposes,  p t and
pt represent typical and reduced threshold risk levels, respectively. The reductions from
i p  to pi are shown as equal in each case to ease comparison. In the case of an
underestimation of risk, perceived  p u and pu are to the left of the threshold values, as is
the function V. Once aware of the perceptual error in assessing the risk levels of the
products, individual’s willingness to pay increases from Vu to Vt. Overestimation is
depicted by  p o and po to the right of the threshold (as is the function V), and is reflected
                                                
5 The behaviour of V(p) as p approaches zero or unity reflects the individual's attitudes towards extreme
safety and danger.
6 The marginal value of a decrease in risk is  -(¶V)/¶p and is positive. The marginal value of an increase in
risk is  (¶V)/¶p and is consequently negative.6
by initially higher willingness-to-pay, Vo. When new risk information is incorporated into
the individuals' perceptions, willingness-to-pay decreases from Vo to Vt.
These scenarios assume that objective information is partially or completely
integrated into individual perceptions of food safety risk, and that individual willingness-
to-pay adjusts to reflect new information. Failure to identify statistical differences
between informational stages may indicate that information corresponds to naïve
perceptions, or that it has not been assimilated into individual perceptions. In fact, this is a
simplification of the risk assessment process, as the qualitative nature of risk is complex
and difficult to characterize. The severity of negative consequences and the degree of
personal control are among the issues consumers may consider in their decision-making.
Although overestimation is expected for low-probability risks, there is little a
priori understanding of what events actually qualify as "low-probability". While it seems
likely that illness due to food-borne pathogens represents a low-probability event, whether
individuals perceive it as such is an empirical question. Several hypotheses emerge from
the model. Willingness-to-pay values for reductions in risk are hypothesized to be positive
for risk-averse individuals. Moreover, for concave utility functions with both total and
marginal utility of income in the healthy state exceeding their respective values in the
sickness state, marginal willingness-to-pay values for risk reductions are expected to be
larger for higher initial risk levels. Characteristics relating to risk perceptions are expected
to influence willingness-to-pay.
Consumers' perceptions may develop from available information, knowledge,
experience and environmental factors, as well as personal characteristics, social and7
cultural background. Most biases are due to systematic, incorrect assessment of
probabilities. For example, low-probability events tend to be overestimated by
individuals, while higher-probability events are generally underestimated. These
perceptual errors, in turn, affect how individuals make choices under uncertainty.
Experimental Model
Indirect evidence, such as expenditure on services or related goods, or direct stated
preference information gathered by surveys, may be used to estimate non-market values
(Buzby et al., 1998). These methods have been used to value food safety, but are subject
to significant limitations. Surveys lack market disciplines, like budget constraints and
substitutes, while little is known about consumers’ characteristics, information set or prior
beliefs in a real market setting (Shogren et al., 1999). Experimental auctions create non-
hypothetical market setting in which participants bid on and purchase products with
specific attributes. They draw strength from both direct and indirect approaches, creating
market scenarios with real choices. Although still facing certain limitations, laboratory
auctions motivate participants to reveal their true preferences for different products and
have emerged as a useful economic tool for non-market valuation (Fox et al., 1996).
Consumers' values for explicit food safety changes can be considered from two
perspectives: willingness to pay for relatively safer food product and willingness to accept
a product with a defined level of risk relatively higher than other products. Consistent
empirical evidence reveals a divergence in values of the two approaches, despite
economic theory suggesting willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values should
be equivalent or fall within a tight bound when income effects are low (Shogren et al.,8
1994). Substitution effects are deemed responsible for the divergence; divergence expands
as the degree of substitution decreases. For private non-market goods without close
substitutes, divergence is robust and persistent. In the case of food safety, markets are
incomplete; health cannot be perfectly exchanged for money.  The nature of our food
safety valuation research makes a willingness-to-pay approach more suitable than
willingness-to-accept, as consumers indeed face budget constraints in the market, and
must integrate income limitations into real purchasing decisions. Since individuals
generally resist assuming increased involuntary, physical risks, the willingness-to-accept
format could induce protest bidding (i.e., zero bids not reflecting the value of risk or
budget limitations).
7
Experimental auction techniques have been used to estimate values for
characteristics of various food products (Melton et al., 1996; Roosen et al., 1998; Lusk et
al., 2001a, 2001b). Previous experimental auctions for food safety improvements have
used information about Salmonella, E. Coli, Staphylococcus aureus, Trichinella spiralis
and Clostridrium perfringens for their pathogen descriptions (Hayes et al., 1995; Fox et
al., 1995,1996; Buzby et al. 1998). Risk perception research suggests that individuals
generally overestimate low-probability risks, yet results for the studies involving
Salmonella risk were inconsistent with this tendency.
8  Hayes et al. (1995) and Fox et al.
(1996) report that participants initially underestimated the risk of Salmonella
contamination. Participants, however, overestimated other pathogen risks. Hayes et al.
                                                
7 Willingness-to-pay approaches may prompt some participants to bid to the budget constraint, an action
analogous to the zero protest bid in willingness-to-accept studies.
8 This inconsistency motivates the question of whether the odds presented in the experiments are sufficiently
low to induce overestimation.9
suggest that this pattern of incorrect assessments may be due to the fact that individuals do
not understand the nature of food-borne illness. Results consistently indicate participants’
willingness to pay a premium for lower-risk foods.
Previous experimental auctions involving food have used several different sealed-
bid auction types. Second-price sealed-bid auctions, known as Vickrey auctions, have
useful theoretical properties (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). The participant with the
highest bid is declared the winner, but pays the second-highest price. A bidder’s dominant
strategy is to reveal his true willingness-to-pay value for explicit increases in food safety,
regardless of how rivals behave. Kagel (1995) notes that the dominant strategy for
second-price sealed-bid auctions is independent of the number of bidders, their risk
attitudes, or the distribution from which their private values are drawn.
Previous applications of laboratory auction techniques (see Fox et al., 1995 and
Shogren et al., 1994) provide guidance for the auction procedure designed to elicit
consumers' willingness-to-pay for reductions in food safety risk. Two explicit risk
reductions were used, broken into two treatments across 12 replications.  The two-
treatment design allows for the evaluation of both absolute and marginal values for risk
reductions.  In the first treatment (Replications 1 to 6), the risk reduction related to the
chance of becoming ill from Campylobacter after consuming the food, and was from an
initial risk of 1 in 75,000 to 1 in 100,000.  In the second treatment (Replications 7 to 12),
the risk was reduced from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 125,000 probability of becoming ill.
Although Salmonella may be more familiar to food consumers, Campylobacter is10
a more common food-borne pathogen (CDC).
9 Chicken consumption is reported as the
dominant risk factor associated with illness from Campylobacter, selected for this study
because of its prevalence and relatively unfamiliarity. "Objective" risk levels for the
product descriptions were based on U.S. data from the Centre for Disease Control
available in Bennett et al. (1987). An estimated 2,100,000 cases of Campylobacteriosis
occur in the United States annually, suggesting an annually probability of infection of 1 in
114.
10 If an individual eats three meals per day every day of the year, the probability that
any meal will result in illness is 1 in 125,143. The probability of contamination of the
highest level of safety was represented in the auction by this objective level, ensuring that
participants were not induced to take on risks they otherwise would not have assumed.
The risk level increments were chosen to provide participants with products with
understandable and significant differences in food safety characteristics. While the
concept of marginal value refers to a small change in the level, small changes may be
difficult for participants to understand in the experimental setting.
While previous experimental auctions for food safety used groups of
undergraduate students (Fox et al., 1995, 1996; Hayes et al., 1995; Buzby et al., 1998;
Lusk et al., 2001b), a wider range of students and members of the university community
was sought.
11 Participants were recruited in person on the University property and through
information signs posted across campus. A maximum of fifteen individuals participated in
                                                
9 Campylobacteriosis, one of the most common causes of bacterial diarrhea, is transmitted to humans
primarily through the consumption of contaminated animal meat products (Franco and Williams, 2001).
10 To calculate the annual probability of infection, the incidence estimate was deflated by a population value
of 240 million.
11 Initial efforts to recruit participants from the community-at-large were abandoned due to time and
budgetary constraints.11
each auction, with different subjects for each of replication.
A practice auction was used to familiarize participants with auction procedures.
This practice consisted of five rounds of bidding to upgrade from one type of chocolate
bar to a different chocolate bar (subjects were given a $2 incentive for the practice round).
Participants’ questions were fielded throughout the practice rounds. The following steps
were followed for each of the actual auctions:
a)  Participants were given bidding cards marked with an identification number, a plain
chicken sandwich, identified as Product A, and $20.
b)  The product being auctioned was presented and identified as Product B. Participants
received written descriptions of the products, describing risk in Product A and B as
"typical" and "lower-than-typical", respectively (see product descriptions in
Appendix). Probabilities of illness from consumption were not presented at this stage.
c)  Sealed bids were solicited from participants to upgrade from Product A to Product B.
At the end of each round of bidding, the highest bidder's identification number and the
second-highest bid price were posted at the front of the room. Ten rounds of bidding
were conducted to elicit participants' naïve values for improved food safety.
d)  After the tenth round of bidding, additional information about Products A and B was
presented to the participants orally and in writing. For Replications 1 to 6, participants
were told that the chances of becoming ill from consuming Products A and B were 1
in 75,000 and 1 in 100,000, respectively. For Replications 7 to 12, the risk from
Product A was stated as 1 in 100,000 and Product B's risk was given as 1 in 125,000.
Participants were also given a brief description of the symptoms of12
Camplyobacteriosis and the actual annual individual chance of illness (see the
treatment details in the Appendix). Bids were then solicited for Rounds 11 to 20.
e)  After the final round of bidding, a number between one and 20 was chosen at random.
Random selection of the binding round assured that each round was as important as
the next from participants' perspectives, and obviates endowment effects in
subsequent rounds of bidding. The overall winner's identification number was
announced, the payment was collected and their chicken product was exchanged for
Product B. To fulfill the non-hypothetical aspect of the experiment, participants
consumed their chicken product.
After the food-safety auction, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
designed to gather demographic, risk-related and experiential information.
12 Participants
were asked not to discuss their auction experiences until all auctions had been staged.
Data
The auctions were staged over four weeks, with daytime and evening sessions scheduled
to accommodate participants with different availability. In total, 166 individuals
participated in the auctions: 81 in Treatment 1 and 85 in Treatment 2.  Table 1 profiles the
demographic information collected from participants. The sample was approximately split
between men and women. The majority of participants were young adults; 140 were
between the ages of 18 and 24 years. Education levels ranged from less than high school
to post-graduate studies.
Table 2 lists the mean bids across participants by replication. Since six or seven
                                                
12 Auctions questionnaires and other materials are available from the authors by request.13
rounds are almost always necessary to generate demand-revealing behaviour (Coursey,
1987), statistics are presented for the complete stages (Rounds 1 to 10 and 11 to 20), and
the four final, stabilized rounds of the stages (Rounds 7 to 10 and 17 to 20). To identify
potential outliers, standardized Z-scores and boxplots were generated for the various mean
values for each individual. Since one individual was flagged as extreme by both Z-scores
and boxplots, further examination of this participant was merited. An erratic bidder, the
participant's behaviour suggests an overall disregard for the experiment. Retention of the
bidder may result in statistical distortion, and his elimination from the sample is justified.
Six other individuals identified in Treatment 1 appear as statistical outliers, but their
exclusion is less justified in the experimental context. These bidders may represent a
segment of the population, those more sensitive to food safety issues and willing to pay
more for risk reductions, and will be retained in the dataset to ensure its generality.
Normality is a fundamental assumption of parametric statistical analysis, as
variation from a normal distribution may weaken the reliability of F- and t-statistics.
Examination of distributions of all bids reveals a departure from normality, confirmed by
Kolmogorov-Smirov (K-S) tests where the null hypotheses of normality are rejected with
99 per cent confidence.
13 Testing distributions of differences in mean bids by treatment
(Rounds 11 to 20 and Rounds 1 to 10, and Rounds 17 to 20 and Rounds 7 to 10 for each
individual) also leads to the rejection of the null hypotheses of normality.
14 Skewness and
kurtosis are other patterns that identify non-normality.
15 Generally, skewness and kurtosis
                                                
13 K-S-statistics are 0.158 (p-value=0.000) and 0.207 (p-value=0.000) for Treatments 1 and 2, respectively.
14 K-S statistics are 0.096 (p-value=0.061) and 0.163 (p-value=0.000) for Treatments 1 and 2, respectively.
15 According to the method used here, normal distributions have skewness and kurtosis statistics of 0.14
values above 1 are considered problematic (Hair et al., 1998, p. 72). Three of the four
skewness values fall below this threshold, yet kurtosis appears in the four distributions as
an abundance of bid values falling around zero. While transformations are available to
correct for skewness and to reduce kurtosis, the directions of skewness and the types of
possible remedies vary across cases. A given transformation may reduce nonnormality for
one distribution while accentuating it for others. Transformations were not attempted, as
they would likely have failed to improve the normality of the dataset.
Visual inspection of the data suggests that the distributions would be relatively
normal if the large number of zeros were not present. Instead, their presence causes non-
normality and has the potential to weaken the reliability of parametric tests contingent on
normality. However, since nonparametric tests are robust to non-normality, results of both
parametric and nonparametric tests are presented.
16
Discussion of the results are divided in four sections, comparing bids across
informational stages and treatments, and estimating willingness-to-pay values for the food
safety risk reductions.
Differences in Informational stages - Treatment 1
Examining the patterns of bids elicited from auction participants can identify possible
biases in food safety risk perceptions, as well as in the over- or underestimation of
probabilities of illness. To test for informational effects, and to identify misassessments of
food safety risk levels, differences in the mean bids in the informed and naïve rounds are
tested.  This test is based on the full data set (i.e., mean bids from all informed and naïve
                                                
16 See Conover (1999) for specific details of the tests used.15
rounds) and the stabilized rounds (i.e., rounds 7 to 10 and 17 to 20). Rejection of the null
hypotheses of no differences across informational stages implies that participants
reconsidered their risk reduction valuation decision upon receiving information about
objective pathogen risk levels and symptoms of illness. The information provided after the
10th round may have influenced individuals’ perceptions of food safety risk. Figure 2
shows the average bids for the replications in the first treatment.
Table 3 summarizes the results of the parametric and nonparametric testing.
Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) test uses the magnitude and sign of the differences to test
for differences in means.
17 Note that a WSR test statistic less than zero and based on
negative ranks is analogous to a positive t-test statistic. Examining the auction groups
individually, statistically significant differences between informational stages are found
for three of the six replications. In Replications 2, 4, and 5, the mean bids increased when
information about the pathogen risk was released to participants, and the differences are
significant, suggesting an initial underestimation in the pathogen risk. On average,
participants in the naïve rounds of these auctions perceived the pathogen risk to be less
likely than the threshold levels presented after Round 10. While test statistics are negative
(WSR is negative in interpretation) for Replication 1, they are not statistically significant.
Test statistics for Replications 3 and 6 are positive but not statistically significant.
Before testing for differences in the means from the entire treatment, the statistical
appropriateness of pooling Replications 1 through 6 is tested. Levene's test, a parametric
                                                
17 WSR test assumes the symmetry of the distribution of differences. A previous discussion of normality
identified skewness for only one of four cases and visual inspection suggests that the distributions are
indeed reasonably symmetric.  As such, the WSR is used for this analysis.16
procedure, tests the null hypothesis of homogeneous variances. The Kruskal-Wallis (K-
W) test examines differences in distributional locations, while assuming that all samples
are independent. Table 4 summarizes the results, which indicate that the null hypotheses
of samples from an identical population are rejected if all replications are included in
Treatment 1.
Visual inspection of Figure 2 shows Replications 4 and 5 as distinct from the other
auctions; the magnitude of the bids in these auctions fall above and below, respectively,
the means of other replications in Treatment 1. As expected, omission of these
replications from the treatment yields results that do not lead the rejection of the null
hypotheses of homogeneous variances and identical distribution functions. Yet, the
research value of excluding these auctions is questionable; while these replications may
be statistically aberrant, they provide interesting behavioural information. In Replication
4, several participants engaged in a bidding war, escalating the price in each subsequent
round. Auction monitors observed no unusual behaviour, as participants appeared to be
vying in earnest for the auctioned product. Replication 5 involved several individuals who
bid very low.
18 Their inclusion in the dataset, while not remarkable on a treatment level,
lowers the mean bids for that particular replication. To eliminate these replications is to
lose valuable experimental information – the trade-off of statistical strength and
behavioural information value is apparent. While further testing has been included for all
replications and the censored treatment (Replications 1, 2, 3, and 6), the issue of lost
                                                
18 Two of the 12 participants placed zero bids across all rounds, while another participant’s bids averaged
only $0.07 across the 20 rounds.17
behavioural information must not be overlooked.  Nevertheless, to allow for differences in
the analysis with and without the aberrant replications, tests are conducted with all
replications and with only Replications 1, 2, 3 and 6.
Table 5 presents the results of tests for significance differences across
informational stages for Treatment 1. When all replications in Treatment 1 are examined,
there are statistically significant differences between naïve and informed stages of the
experimental auctions. The release of information appears to induce an increase in mean
bids (positive t-statistics and negative WSR statistics based on negative ranks).
Participants were given information not only about the threshold odds of illness, but a
short description of the symptoms of illness due to Campylobacter. While there is
evidence that individuals may assess the frequency of events by the ease with which
examples of occurrences can be conjured (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), this
phenomenon, described as the availability heuristic, is assumed to be small in this case.
Individuals tend to be familiar with the effects of mild food-poisoning, and it is reasonable
to proceed as though individuals were responding primarily to the probability information.
Results suggest that participants initially underestimated the likelihood of
contracting Campylobacter from the sandwiches, relative to the threshold odds of 1 in
75,000. When informed of the probabilities, many participants reassessed the opportunity
for risk reduction, and were willing to pay more to reduce the threat. While previous
research suggests that individuals tend to overestimate low-probability risk, the
underestimation may not necessarily conflict with this expectation. Participants appeared
to perceive the risk as less likely than the 1 in 75,000 odds presented. Scientifically-18
estimated odds actually fall below this threshold value.
19 Subjects’ underestimation of the
threshold risk levels may be, in fact, an overestimation of the true odds. To draw
additional conclusions about participants' naïve beliefs about the probability of illness,
more information is required. Analysis of the second treatment reveals a window of
perceived risk. Participants tended to believe that the food-borne illness was less likely
than 1 in 75,000, but more likely than a 1 in 100,000 chance - an overestimation of the
true odds.
Examining only Replications 1, 2, 3 and 6, the null hypothesis of equal means
cannot be rejected for the stabilized rounds (Table 5). There is no statistically significant
difference between informational stages at a 5 per cent confidence level, as the release of
objective disease information had no statistically significant impact on mean bids.
20 These
results suggest that participant expectations about the odds and health effects of
contracting this food-borne disease were similar to those presented in the auction setting,
or that the information had little impact on their perceptions of the risk.
In contrast, results of the WSR test for mean bids from Rounds 11 to 20 and 1 to
10 in Replications 1, 2, 3 and 6 suggest a statistically significant difference between
stages (at a 10 per cent level), and conflict with results from the stabilized rounds.
Overall, the presence of statistical differences across the stages of this grouping of
replications is unclear. Also, as previously mentioned, the informational value of these
censored treatments may be limited. Overall, however, there is strong evidence that
                                                
19 The scientifically-estimated probability of Campylobacter is approximately 1 in 125,000.19
participants' bids increased with the release of objective risk and pathogen information.
Differences in Informational stages - Treatment 2
Similar to the procedure for analysis for Treatment 1, data from Treatment 2 are tested for
statistically significant differences in mean bids between informational rounds.
Hypotheses identical to those for Treatment 1 were tested at replication and treatment
levels. Average bids for the second treatment are presented in Figure 3. Decreases in
mean bids after the release of information are visible in Replications 8, 9, 10 and 11.  The
bottom half of Table 3 summarizes the results of the significance testing undertaken with
the data from Treatment 2.
When considering the full set of rounds and examining auctions individually,
statistically significant differences between informational stages are found for three of the
six of the replications. Inferences drawn from the t-tests and WSR tests are similar for
each hypothesis. Statistically significant differences are found for Replications 7, 9 and 11
when all rounds are tested. The positive test statistics for Replication 7 indicate a
statistically significant increase in bids across informational stages, while the other
replications conform to the expectation of a decrease from naïve to informed stages. In the
stabilized rounds (Rounds 7 to 10 and 17 to 20) of Replications 8, 9, 10 and 11, mean bids
decreased when information about the pathogen risk was released to participants.
Participants may have reduced their willingness-to-pay when they discovered their
overestimation of the odds of becoming ill. Although test statistics are positive for
                                                                                                                                                 
20 It is important to remember, however, the previous discussion about the experimental value of this
censored dataset. There were no remarkable differences in how Replications 4 and 5 were conducted, and
neither had an unusual ratio of male to female participants.20
Replications 7 and 12, increases are not statistically significant when testing means from
the stabilized rounds.
Levene's test for homogeneous variances and the K-W test for equality of
distributions reveal mixed results for the second treatment, summarized in the bottom half
of Table 4. While the null hypotheses of homogeneous variances and identical distribution
functions cannot be rejected for the naïve portion of the auction, there are statistically
significant differences in variances and distributions across the informed rounds. The
statistically appropriateness of combining the replications in this treatment is unclear.
However, the research value gained from considering the combined dataset offsets the
doubts caused by the statistic ambiguity, and further tests results are presented for all
replications of Treatment 2.
The bottom half of Table 5 presents the results of tests of significant differences
across informational stages for all of Treatment 2. Tests of the means of Rounds 7 to 10
and 17 to 20 reveal statistically significant differences between informational rounds,
while tests of all rounds fail to reject the hypotheses of equal means. When information
about the food safety risk was presented to participants, stabilized mean bids decreased.
Participants may have initially overestimated the effects or risk of illness and, when given
details about the risk, reduced their bids to reflect the new information. This
overestimation corresponds with behavioural research suggesting individuals tend to over-
assess the likelihood of low-probability events.
Differences between Treatments 1 and 2
Two treatments are used to measure the difference in marginal risk reduction valuations21
and to investigate diminishing marginal value arguments. Treatment 1 involved a
reduction in risk from a 1 in 75,000 to 1 in 100,000 chance of becoming ill from
Campylobacter. Treatment 2 asked participants to value a reduction from 1 in 100,000 to
1 in 125,000 odds of contracting the food-borne disease. While marginal values are
theoretically measured for small changes, the nature of the experiment required larger
increments to be used – otherwise the marginal changes may have been too small for
subjects to appreciate and understand.
T-tests for independent samples and the nonparametric Mann-Whitney (M-W) test
of central tendency are used to compare the two treatments and test the null hypothesis
that mean bids from Treatment 1 equal mean bids from Treatment 2.  Again, this null is
tested using bids from all rounds and then bids from only the stabilized rounds. In Table
6, all the replications of each treatment are tested, as well as the group of replications
selected in prior analysis. Since all replications were informationally identical in the naïve
stage, failure to reject the null hypotheses of equality at a 5 per cent level of significance
for Rounds 1 to 10 and Rounds 7 to 10 is as expected. However, parametric test results
based on mean bids in the informed rounds differ by treatment, with means in Treatment 1
consistently higher than those in Treatment 2. Failure to reject the null hypothesis using
the selected replication groups (i.e., Replications 1, 2, 3 and 6), in contrast to the results
from the full treatments, reflects the lost informational value of replications 4 and 5.
The concept of diminishing marginal utility suggests that the first marginal change
in risk provides higher utility than subsequent, equivalent reductions. The Jones-Lee
framework supports the concept, as the marginal value of a risk reduction increases with22
initial risk level, as successive equal reductions in risk are valued less. In fact, positive t-
statistics reflect this inequality. Results indicate that participants placed higher value on
the first risk reduction (1 in 75,000 to 1 in 100,000 odds) than the second reduction (1 in
100,000 to 1 in 125,000 odds).
Although M-W p-values for the informed rounds are approaching statistical
significance, the test fails to identify statistically significant differences between values of
marginal risk reductions. Results of the nonparametric testing do not conflict directly with
diminishing marginal value arguments, but fail to confirm its presence in the data.
Willingness-to-Pay Estimates
Two scenarios must be examined to establish willingness-to-pay estimates, based on the
amount of information given to individuals. The first 10 rounds of all 12 auctions were
run identically, representing a situation where a product is marketed as lower-risk without
specific pathogen level or symptom information. Presented only with the decision to
purchase a lower-risk product versus a typical product, participants were willing to pay a
premium of approximately $1.69.
21
To estimate consumers' willingness to pay for specific food safety risk reductions,
mean bids for the informed auction rounds are tested against the null hypotheses of zero
means. Based on mean bids from the stabilized, informed rounds of Treatment 1,
participants were willing to pay approximately $1.93 for the reduction from 1 in 75,000 to
1 in 100,000 odds in becoming ill from Camplyobacter from consuming a chicken
                                                
21 t-stat: 14.8, d.f.: 164, p-value: 0.00023
sandwich.
22 Participants were willing to pay approximately $1.38 for the reduction in
odds from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 125,000 chance of becoming ill, according to results from
the stabilized, informed rounds of Treatment 2.
 23, 24 Since previous valuation experiments
have used different pathogens, threshold odds and marginal risk reductions, and
participants from different countries, it is difficult to directly compare these results to
other studies. However, other research has confirmed that the average consumer is willing
to pay for reductions in food-borne pathogens.
25
Fox et al. (1995) and Hayes et al. (1995) use a LeChatelier principle argument to
contend that these values represent upper bounds on consumers’ valuations of improved
food safety. The LeChatelier principle asserts that when an economic agent sets all choice
variables optimally, the substitution effects are more than short-run substitution effects
when some variables are fixed (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). That is, demand is less
elastic when a subset of variables is fixed. In this case, aspects of the auction are fixed
(e.g., it is a one-shot experience and no substitutes were available). Fox et al. and Hayes et
al. state that as constraints are lifted from the auction markets and participants have more
choices, bids will decrease. They suggest that introducing substitutes would lead to lower
bids for the sandwiches. However, this only holds if the substitutes are lower risk and
products' risks are independent. Introducing higher risk products could actually induce
higher bids for the sandwiches, as risk-averse individuals pay more to avoid the hazard.
                                                
22 t-stat: 8.94, d.f.: 80, p-value: 0.000
23 This estimate differs from the Treatment 2 mean in Table 2 because of the elimination of one outlier.
24 t-stat: 10.15, d.f.: 83, p-value: 0.000
25 In a similar auction environment, Hayes et al. (1995) reported an average willingness-to-pay of $0.86 for
a Campylobacter risk reduction. Fox et al. (1996) reported average willingness-to-pay values ranging from
$0.50 to $1.40 in an examination of consumers’ valuations of risk reductions of Salmonella.24
Substitutes with risk levels not independent of the original auction item’s risk could also
lead to higher bids, as individuals act to minimize their exposure to the risks.
Results of the treatment comparison confirm the arguments of the Jones-Lee
expected utility-based model. Although not every individual submitted non-zero bids for
the product upgrade, on average individuals were willing to pay a positive amount to
reduce the risk they faced. As hypothesized, the marginal value of a decrease in risk
increased with initial risk.
Conclusion
This study aimed to estimate Canadian consumers' willingness-to-pay for food safety risk
reductions, while identifying systematic misassessments of food-borne risk. Examination
of the bids gathered in the experimental auctions leads to several conclusions about
consumers' perceptions and valuations of food safety risk reductions. Without specific risk
information, auction participants were willing to pay a $1.69 premium for a lower-risk
chicken sandwich. Analysis of auction results suggests that individuals were willing to
pay approximately $1.93 for a risk reduction from 1 in 75,000 to 1 in 100,000 probability
of illness due to Campylobacter, and $1.38 for a reduction from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in
125,000 odds.
Results confirm the hypothesis that individuals are willing to pay for improved
food safety, as well as expectations about the diminishing marginal value of risk
reductions. Overall, the pattern of over- and under-estimation suggests that participants
generally perceived the risk to fall between 1 in 75,000 and 1 in 100,000. This
overestimation of the true scientific odds of 1 in 125,000 corresponds with individuals’25
tendencies to overestimate low-probability risks, an expectation based on past behavioural
research. Moreover, the tendency for bids in Treatment 1 (a higher initial risk of exposure
to a food-borne pathogen) to exceed bids in the second treatment (a lower initial risk) is
consistent with the Jones-Lee conceptual model and the concept of diminishing marginal
value. Willingness-to-pay values for risk reductions increased with higher initial risk
levels (once respondents were made aware of the risk levels).
Like many studies based on a small sampling of individuals, the research faces
challenges in terms of the generality and applicability of results. Students may not display
risk-related behaviour representative of consumers-at-large, facing income constraints that
could impact their valuation decisions, and are perhaps generally more willing to assume
risk. Individuals who are elderly or have heightened sensitivity to health risks may behave
differently, when faced with the same decisions.
The magnitude of the bids themselves seems high. The estimates may need to be
scaled to be practically useful in cost-benefit analysis. However, the direction of changes
in bids between informational stages, the presence of diminishing marginal values and
conclusions about the impact of risk tolerance on relative bidding are consistent with
expectations and provide valuable information.
Results of this study provide strong evidence supporting the experimental auction
method as a willingness-to-pay measurement tool. Although bid magnitudes must be
carefully interpreted, the information gathered reveals interesting and plausible insight
into valuation decisions and the assessment of food-related risks.26
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Figure 1. Relationship between amount V and probability p, and impact of over- and
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Replication 7 Replication 8 Replication 9
Replication 10 Replication 11 Replication 1232
Table 1.  Summary of demographic variables.
Treatment Averages
Variable Definition 1 2
Gender 1 if male; 0 if female 0.51 0.47
(0.50) (0.50)
Age Average age category of respondents: 1.21 1.49
1=18 to 24 years (0.92) (1.11)
2=25 to 29 years
3=30 to 34 years
4=40 to 44 years
5=45 to 49 years
6=50 to 54 years
7=55 to 59 years
Adults Average number of adults in household: 3.48 3.32
(1.09) (1.14)
Children Average number of children in household: 0.63 0.56
(1.15) (0.94)
Education Average education category of respondents: 2.43 2.74
1=did not complete high school (0.88) (1.07)
2=high school
3=college or technical school
4=university (degree)
5=post graduate (Masters, Ph.D.)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.33
Table 2. Mean Bids for Replications 1 to 12
Means of Rounds
1 to 10 7 to 10 11 to 20 17 to 20
Mean bid in:
Replication 1 1.40 1.54 1.37 1.35
Replication 2 1.43 1.51 1.94 2.00
Replication 3 1.65 1.77 1.73 1.78
Replication 4 2.95 3.61 4.01 4.11
Replication 5 0.47 0.43 0.80 0.83
Replication 6 1.29 1.35 1.32 1.31
Treatment 1 1.55 1.73 1.90 1.93
Replication 7 2.18 2.81 2.57 2.96
Replication 8 1.30 1.24 1.06 1.05
Replication 9 1.83 2.09 1.36 1.37
Replication 10 1.76 1.85 1.63 1.58
Replication 11 1.30 1.35 0.57 0.43
Replication 12 1.50 1.52 1.64 1.64
Treatment 2 1.66 1.84 1.49 1.5334
Table 3. Comparison of naïve and informed mean bids by treatment and replication.
a
 Difference in mean bids in
rounds 11 to 20 and 1 to 10
(i.e., all rounds of bids)
Difference in mean bids in






Replication 1 -0.36 -0.76
c -1.71 -1.22
c
(0.723) (0.445) (0.115) (0.223)
Replication 2 2.64 -2.44
d 1.89 -1.61
 d
(0.019) (0.015) (0.080) (0.108)
Replication 3 0.39 -0.67
d 0.07 -0.31
 d
(0.702) (0.505) (0.944) (0.754)
Replication 4 3.01 -2.34
 d 1.59 -1.77
 d
(0.010) (0.019) (0.135) (0.077)
Replication 5 2.94 -2.40
 d 2.77 -2.43
 d
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015)
Replication 6 0.11 -0.16
 d 0.20 -0.16
c
(0.913) (0.875) (0.843) (0.875)
Treatment 2
Replication 7 2.61 -1.92
d 1.40 -0.80
d
(0.022) (0.056) (0.186) (0.422)
Replication 8 -1.75 -1.52
c -2.18 -2.21
c
(0.110) (0.128) (0.055) (0.027)
Replication 9 -2.41 -2.07
c -1.80 -1.92
c
(0.030) (0.038) (0.093) (0.054)
Replication 10 -0.48 -0.31
c -2.27 -1.99
c
(0.638) (0.754) (0.041) (0.047)
Replication 11 -2.61 -2.86
c -3.16 -2.79
c
(0.020) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Replication 12 0.59 -0.91
d 0.47 -0.66
d
(0.562) (0.363) (0.648) (0.507)
a.  Values in parentheses are p-values. The closer the p-value to zero, the stronger the
argument in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis.
b.  Wilcoxen Signed-Rank significance levels are asymptotic.
c.  Based on positive ranks.
d.  Based on negative ranks35






Replications 1 to 6 Replications 1,2,3,6
Rounds 1 to 10 10.75 19.56 3.06 1.33
(0.000) (0.002) (0.036) (0.722)
Rounds 7 to 10 15.86 21.28 2.86 1.35
(0.000) (0.001) (0.046) (0.717)
Rounds 11 to 20 20.21 15.47 0.25 3.38
(0.000) (0.009) (0.862) (0.337)
Rounds 17 to 20 21.56 15.61 0.06 3.82
(0.000) (0.008) (0.980) (0.282)
Treatment 2
Replications 7 to 12
Rounds 1 to 10 1.63 3.35
(0.161) (0.647)
Rounds 7 to 10 1.63 3.98
(0.162) (0.552)
Rounds 11 to 20 3.25 13.62
(0.010) (0.018)
Rounds 17 to 20 3.78 16.51
(0.004) (0.006)
No subsets of
Treatment 2 were tested
a.  Values in parentheses are p-values. The closer the p-value to zero, the stronger the
argument in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis.
b.  Wilcoxen Signed-Rank significance levels are asymptotic.36
Table 5. Comparison of naïve and informed mean bids across treatments.
a
Difference in mean bids in
rounds 11 to 20 and 1 to 10
(i.e., all rounds of bids)
Difference in mean bids in
rounds 17 to 20 and 7 to 10





All replications 3.42 -3.32
c 2.07 -2.20
c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.042) (0.028)
Replications 1,2,3,6 1.57 -1.83
c 0.72 -0.63
c
(0.123) (0.067) (0.478) (0.534)
Treatment 2
All replications -1.35 -1.13
c -2.23 -2.49
c
(0.180) (0.258) (0.028) (0.013)
a.  Values in parentheses are p-values. The closer the p-value to zero, the stronger the
argument in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis.
b.  Wilcoxen Signed-Rank significance levels are asymptotic.
c.  Based on positive ranks.37
 Table 6. Comparison of mean bids across treatments, by Information Stage.
a
Difference in mean bids
across treatments, using all
replications
Difference in mean bids across
treatments using replications 1,




Rounds 1 to 10 0.06 0.29 -0.56 0.26
(0.955) (0.770) (0.577) (0.796)
Rounds 7 to 10 0.37 0.22 -0.53 0.28
(0.712) (0.828) (0.598) (0.777)
Rounds 11 to 20 2.00 1.31 0.93 0.97
(0.045) (0.190) (0.355) (0.332)
Rounds 17 to 20 2.19 1.42 1.11 1.04
(0.029) (0.154) (0.270) (0.298)
a.  Values in parentheses are p-values.
b.  Mann-Whitney significance levels are asymptotic38
Appendix - Product Descriptions
Product A (Your Sandwich):
This product has a typical
chance of contamination by
Campylobacter, a foodborne
pathogen. It was purchased from
a local grocery store.
Product B (For Auction):
This product has been screened for
Campylobacter. It has a lower-than-
typical chance of being contaminated
with a foodborne pathogen.
Treatment 1- Replications 1 to 6:
Product A:
If you eat this food, there is a 1
in 75,000 chance that you will
become ill from Campylobacter.
Product B:
This product has been screened for
Campylobacter. There is a 1 in
100,000 chance of getting
Campylobacteriosis from consuming
this food. This represents a 25%
reduction in the odds of becoming ill.
Campylobacter may cause diarrhea, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting,
headaches, chills and low-grade fever. Symptoms may last for one to seven
days. The actual individual chance of infection of  Campylobacteriosis is 1
in 70 annually. Of those individuals who become ill, one individual in
1,000 will die annually.
Treatment 2 - Replications 7 to 12:
Product A:
If you eat this food, there is a 1
in 100,000 chance that you will
become ill from Campylobacter.
Product B:
This product has been screened for
Campylobacter. There is a 1 in
125,000 chance of getting
Campylobacteriosis from consuming
this food. This represents a 20%
reduction in the odds of becoming ill.
Campylobacter may cause diarrhea, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting,
headaches, chills and low-grade fever. Symptoms may last for one to seven
days. The actual individual chance of infection of  Campylobacteriosis is 1
in 90 annually. Of those individuals who become ill, one individual in
1,000 will die annually.